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Virtually all organizations are concerned about employee safety and the 
prevention of workplace accidents, but maybe unaware that most accidents are the cause 
of unsafe employee behaviors. In this study, one company in particular wanted to know 
where, when, how, and why accidents were occurring in its plant. 
Accidents of the past three years were content analyzed. The results show that 
87.4% of the accidents were due to unsafe behaviors. The highest absolute frequency of 
accidents occurs in the die cast area, while the highest relative rate of accidents occurs in 
the furnace room. The type of accident that occurs with the highest frequency is 
lacerations and the highest rate of accidents occurs during the first shift. 
The accident analysis can now serve as the basis for the development of a 
behavioral safety training program. With its implementation, a behavioral safety program 
has the potential to save thousands of dollars and give the workers a safer environment in 
which to work. 
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Introduction 
Virtually all organizations are concerned about employee safety and the 
prevention of workplace accidents. An effective approach to controlling workplace 
accidents is the behavioral approach to safety. The behavioral approach to safety is the 
concept that employees' behavior in the workplace significantly impacts the number of 
accidents that occur. The behavioral approach to safety is most often utilized in 
behavioral safety programs, which organizations develop to reduce the accident rate and 
change their employees' attitudes about safety in the workplace. 
This researcher will discuss the role of government in safety and behavioral safety 
programs, followed by the need for behavioral safety and its principles. The roles that 
both employees and management play in promoting behavioral safety will be reviewed. 
Finally, the available behavioral safety literature will be discussed. 
The Role of Government in Safety 
Nearly every employee in the United States is under the jurisdiction of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Workplace safety is an 
important concern for organizations, but it wasn't officially recognized until Congress 
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The recognition of workplace 
safety led to the creation of OSHA in 1971 ("OSHA Facts," 2003). OSHA's mission is to 
ensure safe and healthy workplaces in America, with the assistance and cooperation of 
both federal and state governments. Since 1971, workplace fatalities have been cut in half 
and occupational injury and illness rates have declined 40 percent. The government must 
continue to work in partnership with employers and employees to prevent injuries and 
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ensure a safe working environment ("OSHA Facts," 2003). The facts alone show that 
OSHA has made a difference in the past thirty-two years. 
OSHA has a staff of 2,303, including approximately 1,123 inspectors, complaint 
and discrimination investigators, engineers, physicians, educators, standards writers, and 
other personnel spread over 200 offices throughout the country ("OSHA Facts," 2003; 
"OSHA Mission," 2003). The staff sets standards, enforces those standards, and reaches 
out to employers and employees through technical assistance or consultation programs. 
There are also other users of OSHA's services, such as lawyers, journalists, and the 
academic community ("OSHA Mission," 2003). 
On May 12, 2003, OSHA launched a five-year plan to reduce workplace fatalities, 
injuries, and illnesses (Hofmann, 2003). By 2008, OSHA hopes to see a 15% reduction in 
workplace fatalities and a 20% reduction in workplace injuries and illnesses. OSHA plans 
to achieve these goals by emphasizing safety improvements in specific areas. The plan 
includes reducing hazards through direct intervention, promoting a safe culture through 
compliance assistance, and maximizing its own effectiveness. 
It is important for an organization to increase workplace safety, not only for the 
employees' well being, but also for its own success. When an employee is injured on the 
job, the results are lost time and production, medical expenses, rehabilitation, and higher 
worker's compensation premiums (Lazzara & Kren, 2003). The liabilities of industrial 
injuries are increasing at an alarming rate (Geller, 2001). Each year, employers are 
paying approximately $200 billion in direct costs associated with injuries both on and off 
the job. Many injuries go unaccounted for and OSHA does not record deaths, suicides, 
and homicides in calculating their estimates. 
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According to a recent poll by the Liberty Mutual Group, 61% of executives claim 
each dollar spent on enhancing workplace safety saves their organization three dollars 
(Lazzara & Kren, 2003). Ninety-five percent believe workplace safety positively impacts 
a company's financial performance. With OSHA's help, employers can find out how 
much a workplace accident would cost them. They can download free, interactive 
software to estimate average direct and indirect costs of injuries and illnesses. 
The Need for Behavior-Based Safety 
There are a number of different approaches to maximize safety. The two 
dominant approaches are the engineering approach and the behavioral approach. Strong 
arguments have been made both for and against each approach. The engineering or 
ergonomics approach to workplace safety focuses on making changes to workplace 
stations and to the overall workplace environment (Loafmann, 2001). These safety 
changes can decrease the number of injuries sustained by employees, but they cannot 
prevent employees from committing unsafe acts. Organizations are beginning to realize 
that in order to succeed, they must begin to understand and address human behavior. The 
behavioral approach to safety focuses on employees' safe or at risk behaviors in the 
workplace (Schatz, 2003). At risk behaviors refer to behaviors such as not wearing 
goggles, taking shortcuts, or ignoring safety rules while on the job. The behavioral 
approach to safety was given the name, behavior-based safety (BBS), as it became more 
popular among safety professionals in the 1970's. 
The behavioral approach did not become popular until the late 1970's, but safety 
research by behavioral scientists had begun as early as 1930 (Petersen, 2000). Even at an 
early stage in behavioral safety research, Heinrich (Petersen, 2000) and his colleagues 
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found that an overwhelming number of accidents (88 %) were due to unsafe acts on the 
part of employees. Relatively few accidents, approximately 10 %, are considered to be 
the result of mechanical or physical conditions (Komaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978). The 
continuation of this type of research led to the foundation of the behavioral safety 
concept. The behavioral approach identifies the desired performance and provides a 
positive means of motivating employees to consistently perform in a safe manner. 
Employees can be given positive reinforcement such as informational, social, and 
tangible rewards for performing safe acts (Komaki, et al., 1978). Some researchers 
consider the behavioral approach to be a proactive approach to safety because it focuses 
on the at risk behavior that might produce an accident or near miss rather than trying to 
correct the problem after the accident or occurrence (Schatz, 2003). 
In 1970, Bird and Schlesinger introduced the concept of safe behavior 
reinforcement to the safety profession (Petersen, 2000). The researchers did not invent 
the concept themselves, but merely borrowed it from the field of psychology and 
suggested its potential application to the safety profession. Behavioral concepts 
introduced by distinguished researchers such as John Watson, Ivan Pavlov, and B.F. 
Skinner are the foundation for the behavioral approach to safety. As early as 1910, 
Watson insisted that psychologists focus on observable behaviors. In the 1920's, Pavlov 
demonstrated that over a period of time behavior could be influenced by words. In the 
late 1940's, Skinner demonstrated that behavior could be changed by attaching a 
consequence immediately following behavior. Unfortunately, even though safety 
professionals agreed with the findings, they did not take action. In a sense, the 
fundamentals of the behavioral approach to safety had been ignored for almost 50 years. 
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Many safety professionals present BBS approaches as new knowledge, but they are based 
on well-known, available information (Petersen, 2000). 
Principles of Behavior-Based Safety 
A number of books and articles have been written that describe the principles and 
procedures of BBS. In addition, there have been many systematic reviews of the 
literature, providing hard evidence for the success of this approach to injury prevention 
(Geller, 2001). The successful applications of BBS generally adhere to seven key 
principles. The first principle is from the work of B. F. Skinner. It states that the 
intervention should be focused on observable behaviors. In other words, BBS focuses on 
what people do, analyzes why they do it, and then applies a research-supported 
intervention strategy to improve what people do (Geller, 2001). 
The second principle states that it is necessary to look for external factors to 
understand and improve behavior (Geller, 2001). Rather than try to objectively define 
internal states or traits, it is far more cost effective to identify factors present in the 
environment that may influence behavior. These factors can then be changed when 
behavior modification is required. An analysis of risky work practices can pinpoint many 
determinants of these behaviors (Geller, 2001). Such determinants include environmental 
factors and inadequate management practices, which could be overlooked without the use 
of BBS principles. 
The third principle states that behavior should be directed with activators and 
motivated by consequences (Geller, 2001). In B.F. Skinner's research, he theorized that 
all behaviors are functions of antecedents (also called activators) and that there are 
consequences of those behaviors (Reynolds, 1998). The antecedents tell us what to do in 
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order to receive a consequence (Geller, 2001). We follow through with the activated 
behavior because we expect that it will provide a pleasant consequence or help us avoid 
an unpleasant consequence. This principle is referred to as the ABC model, with "A" for 
antecedent, "B" for behavior, and "C" for consequence. It is a method used for analyzing 
and developing ways to influence safe and at risk behavior (Krause, 1998). Users of the 
BBS approach use this three-term contingency model to design interventions for 
improving behavior at individual, group, and organizational levels (Geller, 2001). 
According to Reynolds (1998), antecedents can be thought of as "pre-existing 
sensory and intellectual input that influence one's decision-making process" (p. 23). In 
other words, they are initiators of performance (behavior). The following are two 
antecedents thought to elicit safe behavior: knowledge of peer observation and the 
activity of being observed (Krause, 1998). The use of antecedents prompts people to 
perform behaviors when they know they are being observed. Consequences are events 
that occur as a result of behavior (Reynolds, 1998). Based on how important the 
consequence is to the individual, the behavior will either be reinforced or discouraged. 
Consequences often come in the form of verbal, visual, and summary feedback for safe 
behavior (Krause, 1998). The consequence is receiving the feedback that helps the 
employees avoid exposure to injuries. Another powerful consequence is that employees 
are able to provide regular input about workplace improvements. They are empowered 
because they are in a position to make safety observations based on their daily work 
experiences. 
The fourth principle insists that users of BBS focus on positive consequences to 
motivate behavior (Geller, 2001). A substantial amount of behavioral research and 
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motivational theories justify the advocacy of positive reinforcement over punishment 
contingencies, "whether contrived to improve someone else's behavior or imagined to 
motivate personal rule-governed behavior" (Malott, 1992, as cited in Geller, 2001, p. 91). 
It is much easier to implement punishment contingencies on a large scale. Hence, this 
form of behavior management is a common one. For example, the government passes 
laws and then enforces them. As a result, Americans avoid breaking the newly enforced 
laws. Regarding industrial safety, however, it is often possible to intervene and increase 
employee's perceptions that they are working to achieve success rather than working to 
avoid failure (Geller, 2001). 
The fifth principle emphasizes the application of the scientific method to improve 
interventions (Geller, 2001). Systematic and scientific observations enable the kind of 
objective feedback needed to discover what does and does not work to improve unsafe 
behavior. Specific behavior can be objectively observed and measured before and after 
the chosen intervention so that feedback can be provided and improvements can be made. 
Users of the BBS approach should first define what specific safe or at risk behaviors they 
want to target. Then, employers and employees need to make behavioral observations 
regarding these behaviors. This observation stage is considered a learning process for 
people to discover behaviors and conditions that either need to be changed or continued 
in order to prevent injuries. After the observation stage, an intervention is applied in an 
attempt to decrease or continue the chosen behavior. Following the intervention, 
feedback is provided in the form of a checklist that identifies the frequency of safe and at 
risk behaviors. Finally, the intervention is evaluated by the level of improvement in the 
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targeted behavior. At this point, the intervention is either continued, refined, or another 
intervention can be chosen (Geller, 2001). 
The sixth principle emphasizes the use of theory to integrate information, not to 
limit possibilities (Geller, 2001). Although most research is theory driven, B. F. Skinner 
was critical of designing research projects to test theory. This type of research can narrow 
the perspective of the investigator and limit the extent of the findings from the scientific 
method. It is better for researchers to be open to many possibilities for improving safety 
performance than to be motivated to support one particular process (Geller, 2001). 
The final principle states that design interventions should take internal feelings 
and attitudes into consideration (Geller, 2001). This principle is taken from the concerns 
of B. F. Skinner about unobservable attitudes or feeling states. The type of behavior-
focused intervention implemented indirectly influences internal feelings or attitudes. 
Developers and managers of a BBS process should use careful consideration of such 
relationships. This principle can be accomplished through the use of one-on-one 
interviews, group discussions, or formally with a perception survey. Sometimes however, 
basic common sense is as good as any evidence one could gather from subjective 
evaluations of other persons' feeling states (Geller, 2001). 
Behavioral Safety Programs 
The design of behavioral safety programs is based on the principles of behavioral 
safety. These safety programs are not usually referred to by an official title such as 
behavioral safety programs (Topf, 1998). Instead, they are referred to as safety meetings, 
motivational efforts, safety manuals, a discipline system, an active training system, 
written policies and other related components. It is important to note that one type of 
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safety program is not more essential than the next. For example, safety manuals are not 
more important than safety meetings. The programs work collectively, each contributing 
to an effective whole. 
Many strictly BBS approaches are structured primarily around observation of 
behaviors and feedback (Topf, 1998). These traditional methods are useful to ensure 
acceptance of the process and permanence of behavioral change. However, an 
organization must reach beyond behavior to affect the way employees think and feel. 
Employee belief systems about safety must change, which in turn, promotes change in 
individual and group attitudes and the behavior needed to produce an organizational 
culture change. 
The primary goal of the behavioral process is to produce self-motivated, self-
managed employees who behave in a safe manner even when their supervisor is not 
present and when no rewards or punishment are given as a result of their good behavior 
(Topf, 1998). Once safe attitudes are in place, observation and reinforcement can be 
introduced to encourage and support safe behaviors and correct or improve undesired 
behaviors. 
Behavior-Based Safety in Organizations 
In many settings, BBS has become an important facet in the total injury 
prevention package (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). It has been integrated with areas 
such as ergonomics, engineering, training, and occupational health and safety 
management. An important concern of critics, however, is that BBS may have the 
potential to encourage companies to place all responsibility for safety on the employees 
and then blame them when accidents occur (Atkinson, 2000). Experts say that if this 
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placement on the employee does occur, BBS will indefinitely fail. Safety-related 
behaviors not only include those of the employees but also those of supervisors, 
managers, and others whose support is crucial (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). 
The overall focus of behavior-based safety must remain on management. Safety 
can only be achieved when both management and employees work together and perceive 
safety as a value, not a priority subject to changes depending on other circumstances 
(Petersen, 2000). Safety managers are beginning to recognize that culture as perceived by 
employees dictates which elements of a safety program will work and which will not. 
From the perspective of organizations, if a behavior-based system adds value, it will 
remain; if it creates waste, it will be terminated. Also, if BBS is considered to be a 
program, it has no future. If perceived as the way we manage, BBS will survive. 
Executives, stockholders, and directors focus on the bottom line and want to know how 
much it will cost and what will they get in return (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). BBS 
data are beginning to show short and long-term savings due to reduced injuries and their 
associated costs. These costs include insurance rates, direct medical expenses, equipment 
replacement and repair, down-time and lost-time costs. 
Behavior-Based Safety and Employees 
The question that remains on the minds of safety managers is how can they turn 
unsafe, risky behaviors into safe behaviors? First and foremost, it is done by involving 
personnel in the process (Schatz, 2003). Historically, most safety awareness programs 
consist of an instructor speaking before a group and communicating safety information 
with little or no feedback from employees. Employees are given more control through 
BBS (Atkinson, 2000). One approach to behavior-based safety training includes 
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personnel by having a group discussion concerning the hazards and critical safe and at-
risk behaviors of a particular job (Schatz, 2003). Employees are instructed to become 
observers by watching and interviewing their peers at work. Next, the observers share the 
results with the employees they observed in group meetings and one-on-one sessions. 
Participants in this process then discuss techniques to increase long-term improvement at 
work. When observed by their peers, employees become consciously aware of what and 
how they are performing. If reinforced over a period of time, a new behavior can be 
established (Schatz, 2003). 
Safety is an important component of human resource management and equally, 
human resource management is an important component of safety (Schatz, 2003). The 
human resources manager should be aware that while BBS provides a positive and 
proactive impact on personnel in the workforce, it can be quite costly. The primary costs 
come from hiring a competent, qualified consultant and the loss of production time, as the 
employees are involved in the process. However, Schatz (2003) insists that the lost 
production time should be compensated for by lower accident rates and lower worker 
compensation premiums. Another major benefit of BBS is that with employee 
involvement, a deeper relationship evolves between the company and its co-workers, 
improving the overall morale of the organization, which in turn improves safety and 
production. Employees now have significant input into the safety program (Atkinson, 
2000). No one wants to see a co-worker hurt. With BBS, employees are given permission 
to help each other work safely. 
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Behavior-Based Safety and Management 
Safety professionals have long been aware of the importance of management 
support and involvement in achieving effective safety improvement (Cook & McSween, 
2000). They know that for behavioral safety to have an impact, safety management 
systems must promote permanent change (Barrett, 2000). To achieve this effect, 
management must address the three key areas of the safety management triad. This triad 
includes people, environment, and policies/procedures. People refers to attitudes, values, 
training, pace, prejudices, locus of control and experience. Environment refers to 
equipment design, layout and condition, housekeeping, and weather. Policies/procedures 
refer to those policies, procedures, and practices that allow people to successfully interact 
with the environment. These three elements combine to produce the antecedents that 
direct behavior and the consequences that drive it. Current safety approaches address 
these three elements through various methods. Training, safety committees, and 
behavioral processes focus on the element, people. Walkthrough inspections, process 
hazard reviews, and maintenance notifications address the element, environment. 
Operating procedures, job safety analyses, and audits address the element, 
policies/procedures (Barrett, 2000). 
Because of their status within the organization, managers and supervisors must 
strive to demonstrate safe work practices and make decisions that reflect their 
commitment to safety (Cook & McSween, 2000). Management must understand how it 
influences behavior through its action or inaction (Barrett, 2000). If an employee puts in a 
maintenance request, the management must react and ensure that the work environment is 
reasonably free from hazards. Management holds the responsibility and authority, and 
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controls the resources that make up the environment. If management chooses not to 
address the hazard or spend the money to eliminate the hazard, it will not be addressed. 
Consequently, in the future when that same employee or a fellow co-worker makes a 
request, he or she may operate under the assumption that management again will be non-
responsive. Not only must management ensure a safe environment but they must also 
provide feedback so that employees are motivated to actively participate. Trust is a key 
issue in this type of situation. Behavioral processes work best when a high degree of trust 
exists between management and employees (Barrett, 2000). 
Why Behavior-Based Safety Needs to Change 
Some safety professionals believe that behavioral safety needs to be improved. 
Changes within today's organizations and their workforces are presenting challenges that 
current established models do not address (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). As older employees 
leave organizations to retire, their knowledge and safety training leave with them. Their 
replacements are novice, inexperienced individuals who know little about safety. At the 
same time, there has been rapid organizational change. Safety professionals insist that 
behavioral safety approaches need to be aligned not only with older employees but with 
younger employees as well. In addition, behavioral safety approaches must be sustainable 
in rapidly changing environments and provide highly visible returns on investment. In 
order to make these changes, a number of behavioral safety elements must be added to 
the original behavioral safety approach. Leadership commitment, a focus on task-specific 
safety behaviors, multiple metrics, outcome-based goals, and multi-directional feedback 
have been identified as the new key elements of behavioral safety. 
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Employees must drive the safety effort because they live with it on a daily basis, 
but management should support this effort (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). Management 
should never take over safety, but key leaders should support the safety effort in the form 
of visible actions rather than tacit, verbal approval. Research indicates (Fern & Alzamora, 
1999) that safety is more likely to be sustained over time when it has the support of key 
leaders. 
Many of today's behavioral safety approaches focus only on the most common 
behaviors at a given site, which represent only a portion of the key safety behaviors (Fern 
& Alzamora, 1999). Advocators of this focus believe that employees will be able to 
generalize these behaviors and determine how to translate them to their own jobs. 
However, either generalization often does not occur, or it does not occur often enough to 
be meaningful. Behavioral safety will have more of an impact on avoiding incidents if 
safety behaviors are more specific. 
Many current behavioral safety approaches only measure the number of safety 
observations conducted (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). Fern and Alzamora stated that this 
measure cannot capture the critical information organizations need today. Multiple 
metrics can more accurately provide multiple measures of return and help diagnose the 
root cause of the problems. Fern and Alzamora believe that frequency of feedback, 
employee values for safety, and the degree to which an organization takes visible, 
measurable actions to support a safety effort should be measured as well. Depending on 
the situation, not every organization needs to use all of these measures (Fern & 
Alzamora, 1999). 
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The ABC model is generally considered a good model for identifying 
fundamental, yet essential elements of behavioral safety (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). 
However, research (Fern & Alzamora, 1999) indicates that our thought processes play a 
large role in our daily decisions concerning which actions we take or avoid. Cognitive 
research suggests the ABC model should be changed to the ABCO model. In this model, 
"O" stands for "outcome," the longer-term results of engaging in safe or unsafe 
behaviors. ABCO would help employees recognize the potential impact such a behavior 
would have on their lives. It would motivate employees to engage in safe behaviors and 
avoid unsafe behaviors. For example, wearing goggles and avoiding an eye injury is 
beneficial for employees because they can continue with their everyday life. Not wearing 
goggles and experiencing an eye injury could cause blindness, reduced time on-the-job, 
or reduced quality of life (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). 
Users of behavioral safety approaches must also recognize that employees 
frequently engage in potentially safe or unsafe behavior, even when they are not at work 
(Fern & Alzamora, 1999). One way to help make employees aware of behavioral safety is 
to receive feedback from managers and for managers to receive feedback from 
employees. Feedback should also occur between peers and come from well-respected 
peer safety leaders. In order for feedback to be constructive, however, employees must be 
trained in how to provide proper feedback and how to respond to feedback. They must be 
taught what quality feedback is and when and how to take control of a feedback 
discussion. If indeed behavioral safety is to successfully evolve, these key elements need 
to be acknowledged. In this manner behavioral safety efforts address the needs of the 
future, while becoming more cost effective and easier to sustain. 
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Injury Prevention in Organizations 
Workplace injury and employee illness adversely affect employee quality of life 
and exert an astounding negative effect on corporate profitability (Ficca, 2003). 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a total of 1.7 billion lost-workday injuries 
occurred in 1999. The majority of injuries and illnesses (41%) were sprains and strains, 
most often involving the back. The cost of injury and illness is continuing to rise. The 
total of both direct and indirect costs is estimated to be $240 billion. As the U.S. 
workforce ages and healthcare premiums continue to rise, the health-care cost problem 
will only worsen. Employees have been working longer hours and are spending more 
time at work than they are at home. U.S workers are going home in a dramatically 
different condition compared to that in which they reported to work. Employers and 
employees both have safety responsibilities, but unsafe behaviors are the primary cause 
of workplace injury (Ficca, 2003). 
Research has shown that awareness levels and unsafe attitudes cause two major 
types of behavior (Topf, 1998). The first type of behavior is unconscious, automatic, non-
deliberate behavior. It is characterized by daydreaming, inattention, and stress, which 
results in loss of focus. The second type of behavior is conscious, premeditated, 
deliberate behavior, such as taking shortcuts, bypassing procedures, and similar 
calculated risk-taking. Most injuries (Topf, 1998) result from the first type of behavior. 
Increasing awareness and changing attitudes can decrease the occurrences of these non-
deliberate behaviors, as well as the application of behavioral safety principles. 
The use of behavior-based safety programs for injury prevention is required to 
make the shift to safer, healthier behaviors (Ficca, 2003). The goal is to translate 
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intentions, training, and processes into actual behaviors, however involvement at every 
level of the corporate operation is necessary to produce the desired outcome. The main 
focus of a behavior-based safety program should be directed by its intended positive 
impact on corporate productivity and the lives of workers and their families (Ficca, 
2003). 
Research on Behavior-Based Safety 
Several studies (Komaki et al., 1978; Komaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980; 
Reber & Wallin, 1984; Reber, Wallin, & Duhon, 1993; Boyce & Geller, 2001; Williams 
& Geller, 2000; Chhokar & Wallin, 1984) have documented the effects of the behavioral 
safety approach. Three of these will be discussed in detail including the reasons for the 
studies and what was found as a result. 
Komaki et al. (1978) used a behavioral approach to improve safety practices in a 
food manufacturing plant. They used a direct observational technique emphasizing a 
variety of set practices. In this technique, employees were positively reinforced for 
performing safe behaviors. The researchers found that when the desired performance was 
identified, the workers recognized exactly what and how behaviors should be performed. 
Employees agreed upon a reasonable goal that allowed for less than perfect performance. 
Instead of focusing on avoiding an accident, the workers focused their efforts on 
motivating one another to perform safely. Feedback was used as reinforcement, which 
improved performance substantially. The feedback was positive, objective, and 
influential. It was also provided frequently and publicly. At the conclusion of their study, 
Komaki et al. found that when safety was behaviorally defined and positively reinforced, 
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workers reacted favorably to the program and substantially improved their safety 
performance. 
In a subsequent study, Komaki et al. (1980) asked the following two questions: Is 
training alone sufficient to substantially improve performance on the job? Is it necessary 
to provide feedback to maintain performance? This study was different from Komaki et 
al. (1978) previous study in that the last study included a component analysis that 
analyzed the intervention in terms of each of its components. Desired safety practices 
were behaviorally defined for four sections of a city's vehicle maintenance division. 
Komaki et al. used a multiple-baseline design with a reversal component, that included 
the following five conditions: baseline, Training only 1, Training and Feedback 1, 
Training only 2, Training and Feedback 2. The researchers found that performance did 
not substantially improve until feedback was introduced, which led them to conclude that 
training alone is not sufficient to substantially improve and maintain performance. The 
results of the study suggested that "although proper training is essential, safety training 
alone is inadequate, that more attention should be devoted to the provision of 
consequences for desired performance, and that feedback is an effective and readily 
accepted motivational strategy" (Komaki, 1980, p. 268). 
Reber and Wallin (1984) attempted to demonstrate the benefits of providing 
knowledge of results (KR) in addition to goal setting in a strategy to improve 
occupational safety in a farm-manufacturing firm. The researchers hypothesized that 
safety performance would improve when specific, difficult, and accepted goals were set. 
It was also hypothesized that performance would further improve when feedback was 
provided to employees about their department's performance in relation to their goal. 
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Reber and Wallin used a multiple-baseline design with the following four phases: 
baseline, training only, training and goal setting, and training, feedback, and KR. They 
found that although behavioral safety performance improved significantly after a goal 
was assigned and accepted, in general the goal was not achieved until KR was provided. 
In their final conclusion, Reber and Wallin stated that the addition of KR resulted in even 
greater increases in performance than goal setting plus training and training only. 
Present Study 
The available research on behavioral safety and its application suggest that 
workplace safety is an important concern for many organizations. Behavioral safety 
approaches have proven effective in reducing accidents. Behavioral safety programs can 
be established in organizations to target specific behaviors related to the job. One of the 
first steps in BBS is an analysis of accidents to identify specific unsafe behaviors that 
have resulted in accidents. 
In the present study, a behavioral accident analysis was used to discover the 
reasons for an alarmingly high accident rate at a precision die-casting company in 
western Kentucky. The analysis will provide the foundation for the development of a 
behavioral safety program for this company. Currently, this company has a rate of 23-24 
accidents per year, a rate the company considered to be too high a rate. It is costing the 
company thousands of dollars and its employees are at risk. The company wanted to 
know what, where, when, and how these accidents were occurring. Consequently, the 
analysis of accidents over the past three years was undertaken. 
Four hypotheses addressed the details of this dangerous and costly problem. 
Consistent with behavioral safety research (Komaki et al., 1978; Komaki et al., 1980; 
20 
Reber &Wallin, 1984), the first hypothesis is based on the assumption that the majority of 
injuries will have behavioral causes. 
Hypthosis 1: More than eighty percent of the accidents will be the result of unsafe 
behaviors. 
The company under study has three shifts. Management suspects that a disproportionate 
percentage of accidents occur on the third shift. Research on shift work (Hazelwood, 
2003) indicates that this is most often the case and that the graveyard shift is 20% more 
likely to suffer severe accidents than the day shift. The following hypothesis addresses 
the times at which accidents are most likely to occur: 
Hypothesis 2: A disproportionate percentage of accidents will have occurred 
during the third shift. 
This company has several areas in which employees work. Areas include the machine 
shop, die cast room, maintenance, quality, furnace room, tool room, and shipping and 
receiving. Based on the Human Resource Director's observations, the following 
hypothesis was made: 
Hypothesis 3: Fifty percent or more of accidents will have occurred in the 
machine shop than the other areas in the company. 
The injuries that have been occurring in this company range from lacerations to pulled 
muscles. The Human Resource Director suspects that a disproportionate percentage of 
injuries are lacerations. 
Hypothesis 4: A disproportionate percentage of injuries that have been occurring 
are lacerations. 
Method 
Accident Reports 
Data were collected from the company's archives, which included OSHA logs 
and detailed accident reports. Three years of data from 2000 to 2002 were used to get a 
reliable description of the type of accidents occurring. Each accident report includes the 
date of the accident, what time the accident occurred, where the accident occurred, a 
detailed description of what occurred (probably the unsafe behavior that resulted in the 
accident), if the worker was able to return directly to work, if faulty equipment was 
involved, the conditions of the working environment, how to avoid similar accidents (i.e., 
the safe behavior that would prevent accidents in the future), and the supervisor's 
response. 
Procedure 
Data were retrieved from each accident report, including the date of the accident, 
what time the accident occurred, where the accident occurred, a detailed description of 
what occurred, if the worker was able to return directly to work, if faulty equipment was 
involved, the conditions of the working environment, how to avoid similar accidents, and 
the supervisor7s response. These variables, identified above, were coded and entered into 
a Microsoft Excel data base. In order to establish interrater agreement, a second rater 
coded the accidents. A summary sheet was developed to facilitate coding (see Appendix). 
As seen in the Appendix, the coding of some variables, such as cause of accident and 
what could be done to prevent similar accidents, required more judgment than others, 
such as type of injury, location of accident, shift, and working conditions. Out of 2,567 
ratings, the raters agreed on 93.5% of the judgments. The raters then discussed each 
21 
22 
accident report where there was any lack of agreement until a consensus of 100% 
agreement was reached. 
Results 
A total of 151 accident reports were used from the three-year span of 2000-2002. 
Hypothesis 1 was tested by compiling the percentage of accidents caused by unsafe 
behavior. It was supported, (tiso = 7.48; /K. 001), as 87.4% of the accidents were caused 
by unsafe behavior. The other 12.6% were due to equipment (4.6%), repetitive motion 
(2.6%), or reasons that were uncertain (5.3%). Some might argue that repetitive motion 
actually is an unsafe act that can be modified by changing work behavior. 
Between each section of the plant and three different shifts, the number of 
employees differ. Therefore, it is important to examine the ratio of the number of 
accidents to the number of employees in order to determine which group has a higher rate 
of accidents per employee. These ratios are presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that a disproportionate percentage of accidents will 
have occurred during the third shift, was tested by calculating the number of accidents by 
shift. A Chi-square one-sample test was conducted to determine if a disproportionate 
percentage of the accidents occurred on the third shift. Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
The Chi-Square test indicated that a disproportionate percentage of accidents occurred 
during the first shift %2 (3, A^  = 151)= 122.78,/?< 001. Of 151 accidents, 61.6% occurred 
during the first shift, 22.5% occurred during the second shift, 15.2% occurred during the 
third shift, and 0.7% did not indicate shift. The accidents to employee ratios in Table 1 
further support the finding that accidents occur at a higher rate during the first shift than 
the other two shifts. 
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Table 1 
Accidents to Employee Ratios 
Shift Ratio 
First 93/130 = 1 accident per 1.40 employees 
Second 34/81 = 1 accident per 2.38 employees 
Third 23/60 = 1 accident per 2.61 employees 
Note: Cumulative accidents over three years 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that 50% or more of accidents will have occurred in the 
machine shop rather than other areas in the plant. A one-sample t-test (tiso = -8.06; 
p<.001) indicated that fewer than 50% of accidents occurred in the machine shop. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. To further explore this hypothesis, locations were 
grouped into two categories according to the frequency of accidents. The first group 
included those locations in which very few accidents occurred (i.e., fewer than 10). The 
second group included those locations in which 10 or more accidents occurred. A Chi-
square one-sample test was conducted on locations where a higher number of accidents 
occur to determine if a disproportionate percentage of the accidents occurred in the 
machine shop. The Chi-Square test indicated that a disproportionate percentage of 
accidents occurred in die cast %2 (3 ,N= 126) = 66.70,p<.001. Accidents occurred in 9 
locations in the company; 45% occurred in die cast, while 22.5% occurred in the machine 
shop. However, when placed in proportion to the number of employees that were in each 
location, the accidents to employee ratios indicate that accidents occur at a higher rate in 
the Furnace room with 1 accident per .69 worker (See Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Accidents to Employee Ratios 
Location Ratio 
Furnace Room 13/9 = 1 accident per .69 employees 
Die Cast 302 68/83 = 1 accident per 1.22 employees 
Tool Room 11/14 = 1 accident per 1.27 employees 
Machine Shop 403 6/11 = 1 accident per 1.83 employees 
Machine Shop 404 4/8 = 1 accident per 2.00 employees 
Machine Shop 406 5/10 = 1 accident per 2.00 employees 
Machine Shop 401 34/74 = 1 accident per 2.18 employees 
Die Cast 303 3/10 = 1 accident per 3.33 employees 
Machine Shop 402 4/19 = 1 accident per 4.75 employees 
Note: Cumulative accidents over three years 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that a disproportionate percentage of accidents would be 
lacerations. In order to test this hypothesis, type of accident was grouped into two 
categories based on frequency. The first group included those accidents low in frequency 
(i.e., fewer than 10 times). The second group included those accidents which occurred 10 
times or more. A Chi-square one-sample test was conducted on the frequently occurring 
accidents to determine if a disproportionate percentage of the accidents were lacerations. 
The Chi-Square test supported Hypothesis 4. A disproportionate percentage of accidents 
were in fact lacerations, %2 (5, N= 110) = 12.29, p<.05. Of 151 accidents, 19.2% were 
lacerations, 14.6% were due to eye injuries, 11.9% were due to back pain/strain, and 
11.9% were strains. 
Discussion 
The accident analysis indicates that the accidents occurring in this place of 
business are primarily the result of unsafe behavior, as 87.4% of the accidents had 
behavioral causes. This finding is consistent with past research conducted by Komaki et 
al. (1978 & 1980), who found 90% of accidents have a behavioral cause. Behavioral 
accidents can occur for several reasons. Employees are frequently inadvertently 
reinforced for unsafe behavior because tasks are completed quickly or without the hassle 
of safety equipment. Once employees have worked in the same job for a period of time, 
they may skip or forget safety steps. In addition, seasoned workers may not pay as much 
attention as they did when they first started. Based on the accident analysis results, the 
company can begin to develop a safety training program that focuses on safe employee 
behaviors. This change will in turn help prevent similar accidents from occurring in the 
future. 
The results of the accident analysis indicate that 61.6% of accidents occur during 
the first shift. This time frame is anytime between 6:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. During the 
first shift, an almost equal number of accidents occurred in Die Cast 302 and Machine 
Shop 401. It might be assumed that a high number of accidents occur during the first shift 
because more employees work in these areas during this period of time. However, the 
accidents to employee ratio for shift indicate that the high accident rate is still present 
even when expressed as accidents per employee (see Table 1). Based on this information, 
the company can emphasize working with first shift die cast and machine shop 
employees to decrease the number of accidents. 
26 
27 
Based on research conducted on shift work (Hazelwood, 2003), it was assumed 
that most accidents would occur during the third shift, which is in the time frame of 10:30 
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. It has been found that graveyard-shift workers typically make five times 
as many serious mistakes and are 20% more likely to suffer severe accidents than those 
who work 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Hazelwood, 2003). The increased accident rate is 
reportedly due to severe fatigue from being on an irregular schedule. However, there has 
been research supporting the results of the present accident analysis. In a study focusing 
on rest breaks and accident risk, Tucker, Folkard, Macdonald (2003) found that there 
were significantly more accidents on the day shift than on the night shift. The researchers 
were not sure of the reason, but speculated that reduced supervision on the day shift 
might have caused the difference. It would be of interest to the company to determine if 
accidents occurred disproportionately at certain times during the shift, for example, at the 
beginning or end of the shift. 
The accident analysis indicates that 45% of accidents occur in the area known as 
Die Cast 302. In this particular area, employees work with large machinery and hot, sharp 
materials. Some machines are manual, while others are controlled by computer programs. 
The number of accidents may be high due to the equipment with which these employees 
work. It is also a large area with many employees. However, in the Furnace Room, there 
is 1 accident per every .69 employees versus 1 accident per every 1.22 employees in Die 
Cast 302 (See Table 2). These ratios indicate that even though the furnace room only has 
9 workers, accidents are occurring at a higher rate than in other areas of the plant. With 
this information, the company can focus on ways to make the furnace room and other 
areas with high rates of accidents a safer place to work. They can also make the Furnace 
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Room and Die Cast 302 focal points of their safety training program. It would be of 
interest to determine why Die Cast 302 has the second highest accident rate in the plant 
while Die Cast 303 has the second lowest accident rate in the plant. 
The results from the analysis confirm that a disproportionate number of accidents 
were lacerations. Lacerations may occur more often due to the sharp materials that 
employees handle in their job. The second and third most common type of accidents were 
eye injuries and back pain/strain, respectively. Eye injuries occur because employees fail 
to wear their safety glasses. There were instances in which metal flew under the safety 
glasses, but the glasses were most likely not pressed tightly on the employees' face. Back 
pain/strain can occur if employees use their back instead of their legs or arms to lift heavy 
objects. It can also occur if an employee attempts to lift or reach something that is beyond 
their strength capability. In the development of a safety training program, the company 
should focus on safety equipment, proper lifting techniques, and instruct its employees to 
follow safe behavioral procedures in each task they undertake. In addition, the company 
should encourage supervisors to better document the safe behavior that would have 
prevented the accident. 
This accident analysis provides the precision die-casting company answers to its 
questions of who, how, and why accidents are occurring and can serve as the basis for the 
development of a behavioral safety training program. An effective safety program will 
include management commitment and employee involvement, worksite analysis to 
identify present and potential hazards, hazard prevention and control, and safety and 
health training (Bennett-Alexander & Hartman, 2001). Hopefully, the company will use 
the results of this analysis as an impetus to decrease the number of accidents occurring in 
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its plant, and thus potentially save thousands of dollars and give the workers a safer 
environment in which to work. 
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Appendix 
Coding Scheme and Summary Sheet 
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Type of Injury 
1—Laceration 
2—Sprain 
3—Strain 
4—Eye injury 
5—Carpal Tunnel 
6—Back pain/strain 
7—Bruised 
8—Burn 
9—Rash 
10—Arm/shoulder injury 
11—Miscellaneous pain 
12—Hand injury 
13—Leg/foot injury 
Job Title/Occupation/Loc of Acc. 
1—Maintenance 002 
2—Shipping and Receiving 101 
3—Quality 201 
4—Tool Room 204 
5—Furnace Room 301 
6—Die Cast 302 
7—Die Cast 303 
8—Machine Shop A 401 
9—Machine Shop B 402 
10—Machine Shop C 403 
11—Machine Shop 404 
12—Machine Shop 406 
13—NDG 
Time of Day/Shift 
1—AM—Morning 
2—PM—Day 
3—AM—Graveyard 
4—PM—Evening 
5—Uncertain 
6—NDG 
Cause of Accident 
1—Behavioral 
2—Equipment 
3—Repetitive Motion 
4—Uncertain 
On premises at time of accident? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Treatment received at plant? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Did employee return to work? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Restrictions? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Referred to Physician? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Faulty equipment? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Did employee fail to follow 
instructions? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—NDG 
Working conditions 
1—warm 
2—humid 
3—windy 
4—wet floor 
5—dry floor 
6—other 
7—NDG 
What can be done to prevent similar 
accidents? 
1—Be more careful 
2—Minimize flash 
3—Rotate jobs 
4—Monitor equipment 
5—Proper use of equipment/tools 
6—Proper use of safety equipment 
7—Report accidents when they occur 
8—Better equipment 
9—Ask for assistance 
10—other 
Could it have been prevented by 
employer or employee? 
1—yes 
2—no 
3—uncertain 
AR # 
1. Occupation at time of accident 
2. Location of Accident 
3. Employed at facility years 
4. In present job years 
5. On premises 
6. Time of Day 
7. Shift 
8. Cause of Accident 
9. Type of Injury 
10. Treatment received 
11. Returned to work 
12. Restrictions? 
13. Referred to physician 
14. Faulty equipment 
15. Did employee fail to follow instructions 
16. Working conditions at time of accident 
Unsafe Behavior 
Proper safe behavior 
Could it have been prevented by employer or employee? 
How? 
